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Abstract
Theory: We present a model of voter campaign learning which is based on Bayesian
learning models. This model assumes voters are imperfectly informed and that they in-
corporate new information into their existing perceptions about candidate issue positions
in a systematic manner.
Hypothesis: Additional information made available to voters about candidate issue po-
sitions during the course of a political campaign will lead voters to have more precise
perceptions of the issue positions of the candidates involved.
Data and Methods: We use panel survey data from the 1976 and 1980 presidential elec-
tions, combined with content analyses of the media during these same elections. Our
primary analysis is conducted using random eects panel models.
Results: We nd that during each of these campaigns many voters became better in-
formed about the positions of candidates on many issues and that these changes in voter
information are directly related to the information ow during each presidential cam-
paign.
Do Voters Learn from Presidential Election
Campaigns?

R. Michael Alvarez Garrett Glasgow
1 Introduction
Political scientists have long been pessimistic about the eects of presidential campaigns
on voter decision making. The pioneering work of the \Columbia School" in the compan-
ion volumes The People's Choice by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944) and Voting
by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) set the agenda both methodologically and
substantively for what is now called the \minimal eects" hypothesis. Their goal was to
measure the changes in preferences which the Columbia researchers expected to occur
during the electoral season and then match those changes in preferences with campaign
events and information (Natchez 1985). But instead of documenting dramatic changes,
the Columbia team found an amazing stability of preferences throughout the 1940 elec-
tion: \What the political campaign did, so to speak, was not to form new opinions but to
raise old opinions over the thresholds of awareness and decision. Political campaigns are
important primarily because they activate latent predispositions" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson
and Gaudet 1944: 74). In terms of voting decisions, they found that the presidential
campaign changed few minds, and for most voters, the campaign only reinforced their
predispositions to vote for one candidate or the other. Thus they reached what should
have been a startling conclusion: \In sum, then, this is what the campaign does: re-
inforcement (potential) 53%; activation 14%; reconversion 3%; partial conversion 6%;
conversion 8%; no eect 16%" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944: 103). This is a re-
markable nding, since only 14% of their sample changed their voting decision during the
course of a presidential election campaign. Thus began the \minimal eects" hypothesis
| that campaigns and the mass media have only minor inuences on mass preferences
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

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However, more recently there have been many important works supporting the notion
that political campaigns and the mass media have signicant inuences on the mass elec-
torate | both on their preferences and the criteria underlying those preferences. In the
1976 presidential election, Conover and Feldman (1989) observed that misperceptions
of the candidate's stands virtually disappeared as the general election campaign pro-
gressed. Working with data on presidential primaries, Bartels (1988) and Popkin (1991)
have both shown that campaign events and changes in available information about can-
didates lead to substantial changes in the criteria voters use to judge candidates, and
hence, to changes in their relative evaluations of primary candidates. With data from
senate elections, Franklin (1991) has shown that the information made available by the
candidates competing for oce inuences voter perceptions. Zaller, looking at a variety of
national elections, summarized his results (and the recent literature): \Campaigns bring
about attitude change, as we have sought to show, not by producing a sudden conversion
experience, but by producing incremental changes in the balance of considerations that
underlie people's summary attitudes" (1989: 231).
More importantly, this literature argues that the eects of campaigns and the mass
media should not be expressed directly in changes in electoral preferences | in Iyengar
and Kinder's terms, in persuasion. Clearly it is dicult to change the minds of voters,
and neither political campaigns nor the mass media are well suited for that task. How-
ever, perceptions are more malleable, and are thus more likely to change over the course
of a campaign. Perhaps even more subject to change are misperceptions, or the degree to
which the perceptions of voters are inaccurate. Most of these works, from the Columbia
research to the most recent work summarized above, argue that political campaigns and
the mass media can and do inuence voter perception and misperception, and therefore,
indirectly inuence preferences as well. So to study the impact of the political cam-
paign and the media on the electorate, a better focus might be on the perceptions and
misperceptions of voters.
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In this paper we rst oer a theoretical model which provides this focus. We present
a simple model of voter learning which produces a exible and testable model of how
voter perceptions respond to new information about the candidates during a presidential
campaign. Then we test one important set of implications from the model using data
from the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections. We show rst that there were substantial
changes in the information ows during each of these campaigns; as the election neared,
more \substantive" information was presented to voters. Second, we show that with
more information about the policy positions of the candidates, voters perceived those
positions with greater certainty. We then use a random eects panel model to directly
link the campaign information ow with voter learning about each candidate in these two
presidential elections. In the end, we demonstrate that the certainty of voter knowledge
of candidate issue positions responds to the information ow; this provides strong support
for voter learning in presidential campaigns. We conclude with a discussion of the utility
of this approach for understanding voter decision making in presidential elections.
2
2 A Model of Voter Learning
2.1 The Basics of the Learning Model
To examine the dynamic relationship between campaign information and voter perception
and preference, we develop a simple model of political learning based on Bayesian updat-
ing. The voter learning model we discuss here, like the spatial model of voting, is not a
completely descriptive model of behavior. Instead, it provides an explicit, consistent, and
systematic accounting of the way in which individuals might combine newly encountered
information with their past understandings of the political world.
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However, Bayesian
learning models are increasingly appearing in the political science literature, their empir-
ical applications have been successful (Achen 1992; Alvarez 1997; Bartels 1993; Calvert
and MacKuen 1985; Franklin 1992; Husted, Kenny and Morton 1993; Zechman 1978).
The intuition behind our Bayesian model of voter learning is compelling. Basically,
the model states that the voter has prior perceptions or information (called \priors"),
and that these prior beliefs are updated with the acquisition of new information, yielding
revised, \posterior" beliefs. The Bayesian approach provides a particular mathematical
framework for the formation of new perceptions. To express the Bayesian model formally,
rst dene 
kt
to be candidate k's position on a particular issue at time t, 
kt
to be the
voter's knowledge of the candidate's position, and 
kt
to represent information received
about the candidate k's position.
Next, instead assuming that voters should be perfectly informed during a presidential
election season, we assume that they are imperfectly informed about candidates and their
policy stands (Achen 1975; Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Franklin 1994). It has long been
an established truism that voters are poorly informed (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), with
the debate centering over the causes of their imperfect information (Key 1966). Some of
the imperfections in the information ow stem from the candidates and the information
transmission process, others from the abilities and incentives of voters (Page 1978: 281).
Here, we assume that the perceptions of the candidate on issues are known imperfectly
by the voter, and hence, are described as a set of probability distributions. The voter's
prior probability distribution, the voter's calculation of the probability that the candidate
will have a certain position once in oce, conditioned on their knowledge of that position,
is dened by:
P (
kt
j 
kt
)  N(
1
; 
2
1
) (1)
This states that the voter's calculation of the candidate's position developed from past
knowledge of that position is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean 
1
and a
variance 
2
1
. Similarly, the probability distribution that represents the newly encountered
information, 
kt
, conditioned on the candidate's position and the voter's knowledge of
that position is dened as:
P (
kt
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kt
; 
kt
)  N(
2
; 
2
2
) (2)
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And last, the voter's posterior distribution also has a similar denition, where the proba-
bility that the candidate is actually at the particular position is conditioned on the voter's
knowledge of the position and the newly-encountered information about the candidate:
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Now that these probability distributions have been dened, Bayes' Theorem states
that the posterior distribution is proportional to the product of the prior distribution
and the distribution of the newly-encountered information. That is,
P (
kt
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kt
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) / P (
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)  P (
kt
j 
kt
; 
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) (4)
This can be expressed in terms of the moments of these distributions as:
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with:

3
= 
1
+ 
2
(6)
Note that 
j
= (
2
j
)
 1
for j=1,2,3. While the 
j
are termed \precisions" in the
literature, they really are just the inverses of the voter's uncertainty regarding each
bit of information | their previous understanding of the candidate's position, the new
information received, and their new understanding of the candidate's position (Alvarez
and Franklin 1994).
So what is the interpretation of the voter learning model? Where the voter perceives
the candidate to stand on the issue, in light of some new information, is the weighted
average of their past knowledge of the candidate's position and their newly-obtained
information. The weights, further, are simply the precisions of each piece of information,
which have been dened as being proportional to the variances of the relevant probability
distributions. The voter nds out something new about the candidate's position | from
speeches, conventions, advertising, advertisement, the media, or whatever source | and
this alters their perception of this position in the direction of the new information. But,
and of importance for this discussion, the amount by which voters alter their perceptions
depends on the precision of the new information, relative to their past perceptions.
In order to highlight the intuition behind the Bayesian model as presented in Equa-
tion 6, the eects of newly-obtained information upon both the mean and precision of
the voter's posterior distribution regarding the position of the candidate on an issue are
shown graphically. We performed two sets of simulations with Equation 6, using the
following simulation values. The voter's prior knowledge of the candidate's position (
1
)
is 0.5. The voter then receives new information that the candidate's expected position
is 1.5. To assess the eects of the precision of these both the prior and new information
on the voter's posterior knowledge, we then varied the precision of the new information
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about the candidate's position (
2
), which takes a range of hypothetical values from zero
(extreme imprecision) to 20 (extreme precision), and the precision of the voter's prior
knowledge of the candidate's position (
1
), which we varied across three values, low,
moderate, and high. These simulations are given in gure 1, where the top panel gives
the mean of the voter's posterior knowledge and the bottom panel gives the posterior
precision. In each panel, the lines represent one of the assumed levels of prior precision
while the x-axis gives the precision of the new information.
Figure 1 Goes Here
What is interesting to notice in the top panel of gure 1 is the eect which the two
precisions have on the voter's adjustment of their perception. When the precision of their
prior knowledge is low, even relatively imprecise new information can induce a dramatic
change in the posterior mean in favor of the new information. However, as the precision
of the prior knowledge increases, the voter places more weight on their prior knowledge
than on the new information, so the new information must be extremely precise to induce
a change in the perception of where the candidate stands on the particular issue.
In the bottom panel of gure 1 the y-axis represents the precision of the posterior
distribution. Recall that the posterior precision is simply the sum of the precision of the
prior knowledge and the new information, which accounts for the linear relationships seen
in the gure. Not surprisingly, a positive relationship is observed in the gure for each
level of prior precision, indicating that as the precision of the new information increases,
so does the precision of the posterior. Also worth notice here is that new information in
the model always increases posterior precision. Thus, the model predicts that if the voter
has a very precise prior understanding of where the candidate stands on the issue, and
encounters very precise information which leads them to update their prior perceptions,
the precision of their posterior knowledge will be greater, though not by a very large
amount.
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Thus far we have demonstrated two aspects of the Bayesian learning model: the eects
which newly-obtained information has on each element of the voter's knowledge of the
candidate's policy stands | the mean and precision (or variance) of that distribution.
The next step is to show how changes in voter perception of candidate issue positions
are incorporated into their evaluations of the candidates. For this purpose, we use the
spatial model of voting.
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In this version of the spatial model, we assume there are two candidates and that
the preferences and utility functions of voters are such that the axioms of expected
utility maximation apply. Also, we assume that there is one policy dimension relevant
to the voter, and that the voter takes only information about their position and the
candidate's position on this issue into account. The voter's expected utility from a
particular candidate J is the utility the voter would anticipate, conditioned on their
posterior distribution, is (Zechman 1978):
E(U(
J
) j P (
J
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J
; 
J
)) (7)
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This leads to a decision making rule for the voter, that is, vote for candidate J instead
of G i:
E(U(
J
) j P (
J
j 
J
; 
J
))  E(U(
G
) j P (
G
j 
G
; 
G
)) (8)
Assume, as above, that the voter's posterior is distributed normally, with a mean and
a variance (proportional to the precision), and that the distance between the voter and
the candidate can be written in terms of a quadratic loss in utility. This implies that
the voter will prefer candidate J i (
3J
  !
3
)
2
 (
3G
  !
3
)
2
, that is, if the posterior
mean of candidate J is closer to their position ( where the voter's position is denoted by
!) than the posterior mean of candidate G. By substituting from Equation 6 for each
candidate, this gives an amended decision rule, vote for candidate J i:
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2
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(9)
As complex as this might seem, interesting insights into the dynamics of voter prefer-
ences are obtained by analysis of the relationships between information, perceptions, and
preferences in Equation 9. A very easy way to gain intuition into these relationships is
again through simulations. The model in Equation 9 can be written probabilistically, and
in that formulation, the relationship between the various elements of Equation 9 and the
probability that a typical voter might support one of the candidates can be easily shown.
First, to cast this model into a probabilistic format, we assume that the expected utility
for candidate G is zero. Second, we assume that the non-issue components (denoted here
by c
iJ
) of the voter's evaluation of candidate J are distributed normally, and are inde-
pendent of the voter's issue-based evaluation of the candidate.
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These assumptions allow
us to examine the voter learning model probabilistically. First, rearrange the terms:

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+ 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
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+ 
2J
  !
2
3

 0 (10)
I
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 0; (11)
where I
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=

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
: Then, under the assumption that c
iJ
is distributed
normally and independently of I
iJ
, this expression can be written probabilistically:
P [I
iJ
+ c
iJ
 0] =
Z
I
1
1
p
2
exp
 c
2
2
du (12)
This presentation allows us to insert hypothetical values into this probabilistic model
and to depict graphically the relationship between the uncertainty the voter has about
the candidate's policy positions and the probability that the voter would support the
candidate. Four such simulations were carried out, with two in the top panel of gure 2
and two in the bottom panel. Simulation values were identical to the previous simulations
except where noted.
Figure 2 Goes Here
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The x-axis in each panel of gure 2 gives the precision of the newly-encountered in-
formation, and the y-axis gives the change in probabilities of supporting the candidate
once the new information has been assimilated by the voter. The new information the
voter receives is that the candidate is closer to the voter on the issue than reected in
their prior knowledge. Two lines are plotted in each panel, one for a situation where the
new information indicates that the candidate is much closer to the voter's position on
the policy issue than the voter previously believed (dotted line), and one where the infor-
mation states that the candidate is not much closer to the voter on the issue (dark line).
The top panel presents these plots for a situation in which the voter's prior knowledge
was imprecise, while the bottom panel gives the plots for a scenario in which the voter's
prior knowledge was precise.
Comparison of the results of these simulations produces some interesting conclusions.
First, in the top panel of gure 2 it is apparent that when the voter has an imprecise prior
knowledge of the candidate's position, and receives new information that the candidate
is closer to their ideal point, that relatively large changes in the voter's probability of
supporting the candidate occur across a wide range of precisions of the new information.
Compare the following two scenarios. First, the new information is very imprecise, with a
precision near zero, and second, where the information is relatively precise, at a simulated
value of approximately nine. In the rst scenario, the probability that the voter supports
the candidate does not change very much, no matter how close the candidate has moved
to the voter's position, since their perception of the candidate's position is simply not
very precise. However, in the second scenario, notice the wide divergence between the
changes in probability of supporting the candidate where the candidate has moved much
closer to the voter, relative to only slightly closer. As we might anticipate, when the
prior information is imprecise, but the new information is precise, the voter adjusts their
evaluation of the candidate weighing heavily the new information, evidenced by the large
change in the probability of supporting the candidate, and these changes are greater
when the information indicates that the candidate is closer to the voter on the issue.
But in the bottom panel of gure 2, where the prior information is much more precise,
a dierent conclusion is apparent. Again, compare two scenarios, the rst in which
the voter's new knowledge is very imprecise (near zero), as compared to a situation in
which the information obtained is relatively precise (near nine). Interestingly, in the
rst scenario, the voter is very unlikely to support the candidate | since their relatively
precise prior states that they are not very near to the candidate on the issue, and very
imprecise information does little to change this prior. Yet in the second scenario, there
is a change in the likelihood that the voter would support the candidate (the dierence
in simulated probabilities is approximately 0.35 for the voter close to the candidate and
around 0.05 for the voter further from the candidate), indicating that precise information
can lead to a change in preferences when the new information is itself precise.
What is most interesting here, however, is the comparison between the gures. The
conclusions when the new information obtained by the voter is very imprecise do not
vary whether the candidate is near or far from the voter, or whether the priors are
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precise or imprecise. But when the new information is precise, we do see a good deal
of variation depending on the relative location of the candidate and the precision of the
prior knowledge. In the two simulations where the voter is closer to the candidate, they
are more likely to support the candidate when they obtain new and precise information
about the candidate's position.
But when the prior information is less precise, and the information reveals that the
candidate is much closer to the voter, the change in probabilities is drastically greater than
when the prior information is more precise. New information | even relatively imprecise
information | leads the voter to update their knowledge greatly and to even change
their evaluation of the candidate, when prior information about the candidate's position is
uncertain. However, when the voter's prior knowledge is more certain, new information |
even relatively precise information | does not lead to a great deal of updated perceptions
and does not result in relatively large changes in candidate evaluations.
2.2 Insights from the Voter Learning Model
The Bayesian learning model discussed in the previous section revealed some interesting
implications for the way in which new information about a candidate's policy position
might inuence a voter's perception or misperception of a candidate's position and their
evaluation of that candidate. Two general hypotheses follow from the discussion in
the last section. First, voters should update their perceptions of candidate issue stands
when they obtain new information about those stands; thus the perceptions of voters
should change when information about these stands becomes increasingly available during
the campaign. Second, new information may lead voters to change their evaluations of
the candidate in any case, but this is much more likely when prior information is very
imprecise.
Thus by incorporating imperfect information into an individual-level model of voter
preferences and perceptions, the Bayesian approach yields insights into many of the past
ndings in the literature. We have shown that when presented with new information
about the positions of the candidates on policy issues, voters should assimilate that
information into their perceptions of the candidates' stands. This \learning" should
occur on two levels: voters are expected to update, or change, their estimate of the
candidate's position (the mean), as well as their uncertainty of the candidate's position
(the precision). Therefore, when information is available, perceptual learning should
occur in the electorate. Demonstrating this relationship, then, will show that campaigns
can \matter."
Yet the voter learning model also implies that the eects of campaign learning should
be most apparent in the perceptions or misperceptions of voters. Usually, in general
elections at the presidential level, voters will have some, if not a great deal of prior
knowledge of both candidates. In such a situation, the insights of the voter learning model
are that we expect to see new information have little eect on the voter's perceptions
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of the candidates' issue positions, but perhaps a larger eect on the certainty of their
perception; additionally we would rarely expect a substantial change in their preferences.
In this perspective, the \minimal eects" ndings are really not so surprising | in
presidential election, with incumbents ghting against well-known challengers, or even
with nationally-prominent challengers contesting for an \open" seat, voters should have
relatively precise priors even at the beginning of the general election season.
But dierent electoral contexts might produce dierent conclusions. For example,
early in a presidential primary, when voter knowledge of the positions of the candidates
is very uncertain, new information, even if it is also uncertain, can produce large changes
in the voter's perceptions of the candidate's position, their uncertainty of that position,
and even in their preferences. This provides a theoretical account for the volatility
witnessed early in the primary season in voter preferences and perceptions. They have
imprecise knowledge, and learning new information in an uncertain situation can have
dramatic consequences.
So generally, we expect information to have dierent eects across the course of a
presidential campaign. Early in the primary season, when knowledge is imprecise, a little
new information can go a long way | even as far as changing a voter's preferences. But
late in the general election, in the weeks before the general election, voters will typically
have precise priors about the positions of the candidates. So even a lot of new information,
even precise new information, will not induce a change in voter preferences. Late in the
campaign, though, the major source of change should instead be in the precision of their
beliefs; that is, in their certainty about the issue positions of candidates.
Thus, we focus on the eects of campaign information on voter perceptions of candi-
date issue positions. For voter learning about the issue stands of candidates to occur we
must rst demonstrate that information about candidate issue positions is made avail-
able to voters during political campaigns. Second, we must then show that there are
corresponding changes in voter perceptions of candidate policy stands over the course of
the campaign. And third, we must demonstrate that the information about candidate
policy positions is received by voters and that it is used to update their perceptions of
candidate policy stands. We test each of these propositions in the following sections of
this paper.
3 Simple Tests of the Voter Learning Model
Do campaigns provide information to voters about the positions of the candidates? Do
voter perceptions change over the course of the campaign? And can we say that voters
learn about candidate issue positions during the campaign? To answer these questions,
we focus on the 1976 and 1980 elections. Using data from Thomas Patterson's panel
study and media content analysis from this election, and the 1980 NES Major Panel and
our own content analysis of stories from the Los Angeles Times, we test the hypotheses
derived from the voter learning model. For 1976 the panel study consisted of ve waves,
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beginning in January and repeated every two months up until the election. In 1980
the panel study consisted of three waves conducted in February, June, and September.
Unfortunately, the last wave of the NES Panel Study was only a brief fteen minute
telephone interview which did not provide enough information about voter perceptions
to be useful in our analysis.
In both of these panel studies a variety of opinion questions were asked of individu-
als. From questions about media exposure and the issue positions of candidates we can
examine the eects of the campaign on individual perceptions of the candidates. First,
to ascertain the perceptions that individuals had of the candidates in the presidential
campaign we examined how informed they were in their placements of the candidates
on seven point issue scales. In 1976 seven issue scales were presented to respondents in
all ve waves. These issues were defense spending, welfare programs, busing to achieve
integrated schools, ideology, abortion, the distribution of a tax cut, and the government's
role in providing jobs. In 1980 the ve issues available for study were ideology, defense
spending, government spending, ination, and relations with the Soviet Union.
The measure of uncertainty we employ in this section is taken from Alvarez (1997).
There have been two types of survey-based measures of uncertainty in the literature.
First, there are the direct survey question approaches to measuring uncertainty (Aldrich
et al. 1982; Alvarez 1997; Alvarez and Franklin 1994). In these attempts to probe
voter uncertainty, survey questions are explicitly designed to probe uncertainty; some of
these attempts have been quite successful (Alvarez and Franklin 1994). Second, there
are indirect approaches. These rely upon the use of surrogate measures, which either
serve as instruments for uncertainty (Bartels 1986; Franklin 1991), or as attempts to
operationalize uncertainty from survey questions. Our measurement strategy takes the
latter approach.
In our voter learning model, the voter's prior, newly-obtained, and posterior infor-
mation were assumed to be distributed with a mean and a variance. Our approach relies
upon operationalizing this variance in voter understandings of the policy positions of
candidates, by measuring:
v
iJ
= (P
iJ
  T
J
)
2
(13)
where v
iJ
represents voter i's uncertainty in their placement of candidate J on a policy
dimension, P
iJ
gives i's placement of J on the policy dimension, and T
J
indicates the
actual position of candidate J on the policy dimension in question.
This is a representation of the voter's uncertainty about the candidate's position
across the policy space, in terms of the net dispersion of the voter's perception of the
candidate's position and the candidate's true position. The greater the dispersion of their
perceptions of the candidate's position from the candidate's true position (here measured
by the mean placement of the candidate on each issue across the particular sample), the
more uncertain they are about the candidate's position on the policy issues; the tighter
this dispersion of points, the less uncertain they are about the candidate's position. If
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a voter was unable to place a candidate on an issue scale, or did not recognize the
candidate's name, then they were coded as maximally uncertain. Maximally uncertain
voters were coded as if they had placed the candidate on the issue scale at the endpoint
furthest from the mean.
This representation of voter uncertainty is appealing for three reasons. First, unlike
the measures of uncertainty often employed in the literature, this representation directly
operationalizes uncertainty from the survey data, and does not infer indirectly a un-
certainty measure from ancillary information about respondents. Second, this measure
meshes closely with the \precisions" as discussed in relation to the Bayesian model, which
will allow for rigorous tests of the implications of that model. Third, this measure can
be applied to existing survey data, particularly the historical data from the National
Election Studies, where there are questions asking respondents to place candidates on
policy scales. Note that the accuracy of this measure will depend on the accuracy of the
questions used to measure both the voter's and the candidate's positions on the issue.
However, without direct survey questions probing respondent uncertainty, this approach
is quite attractive. Notice that our measure of uncertainty measures how accurate voters
actually are in their placement of candidates on issue scales, rather than how certain
they feel about their placement. However, past research has demonstrated a high degree
of correlation between direct measures of uncertainty (or subjective uncertainty) and the
measure of uncertainty employed here (which measures objective uncertainty).
As a rst look at changes in uncertainty over the course of the campaign, we calculated
the uncertainty measures for all candidates in the rst and last waves of the panel study
in both of the elections we study. Our measure of individual-level changes in uncertainty
about the presidential candidates is simply the dierence between the voter's uncertainty
about the policy stands of each candidate at two dierent points in time; here the rst
and last survey waves. Rather than study the simple dierences between each voter's
uncertainty for the candidates over time, we have analyzed only those reductions in
voter uncertainty which we deemed substantial. To determine substantial changes in
voter uncertainty, we calculated the dierence between the uncertainty measures in the
rst and last waves and the standard error of that dierence. Changes between the two
uncertainty measures at the individual-level were deemed substantial if they were greater
or less than one standard deviation from zero. That is, positive changes greater than
one standard deviation from zero were termed substantial increases in uncertainty, while
negative changes greater than one standard deviation from zero were called substantial
reductions in uncertainty.
We rst calculated the uncertainty measure for Carter and Ford for the rst and
last waves of the 1976 Patterson panel survey (February and October). In tables 1 and
2 are shown the percentages of respondents with increased, decreased, or unchanged
uncertainty about the policy positions of both candidates between the February and
October waves of the panel study. The most striking observation in these tables is the
high proportion of voters who reduced their uncertainty about Carter over the course of
the campaign. On almost all issues, over 50% of respondents had substantial reductions
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in their uncertainty about Carter's positions. Respondents who showed a substantial
increase in uncertainty were always less than 3% of the sample on any issue. Substantial
learning also took place when we turn our attention to Ford, although it was less dramatic
than for Carter. About 70% of the sample remained within one standard deviation of zero,
while about one-fth of the sample experienced substantial reductions in uncertainty.
Those who grew less certain of Ford's positions never comprised more than 10% of the
sample.
Tables 1 and 2 Here
Such powerful evidence of voter learning in 1976 comes as no surprise, considering
the obscurity of Carter at the beginning of the campaign and the fact that Ford was a
nonelected incumbent who had not served a full term in oce. This lack of information
at the beginning of the campaign implied that voters would have imprecise priors about
both candidates, and thus new information would have a large eect on voter uncertainty.
Voters used new information to reduce their uncertainty about both candidates, but
because voters held more information about the incumbent Ford at the start of the
campaign, new information did not have the dramatic eect on voter uncertainty that
was observed for Carter.
We conducted our analysis of the individual-level changes in voter uncertainty in the
1980 campaign using the same methodology as for the 1976 campaign. The individual-
level changes in voter uncertainty across the entire campaign tables 3, 4, and 5 for Carter,
Reagan and Anderson, respectively (however, the Anderson uncertainty changes are only
computed for the last two waves of the 1980 study since issue placements for Anderson
were not included in the rst wave of the 1980 NES Panel Study). Note that very little
voter learning took place for the incumbent Carter. Carter in 1980 is the only elected
incumbent in our sample, and it appears that after three years in oce, there was very
little about him that voters didn't already know. The precise priors held by voters
did not allow new information to have much (if any) eect on voter uncertainty. More
evidence of voter learning exists for Reagan. About 70% of the sample had changes
in uncertainty less than one standard deviation from zero, and about 20% experienced
substantial reductions in uncertainty. Reagan was a much more prominent challenger in
1980 than Carter was in 1976, having pursued a career in acting and serving as governor
of California. Thus it seems likely that voter's priors about Reagan in 1980 were more
precise than they were for Carter in 1976, and so voter learning about the challenger was
less dramatic than it was four years earlier.
Tables 3, 4 and 5 Here
The case of Anderson (Table 5) is interesting, as well. We see that on each issue there
were at least 17% of the electorate who substantially reduced their uncertainty about
Anderson's position; the overwhelming majority, though, were essentially unchanged in
their uncertainty about Anderson's issue positions. This places Anderson above Carter,
12
since there was clearly less learning about Carter's issue position in 1980, but below
Reagan, since there was more learning about Reagan's issue positions. However, keep in
mind that the entries in Table 5 are dierent than those in Tables 3 and 4, since the 1980
NES did not ask Anderson issue placement questions in the rst wave of the panel study.
So, we are estimating changes in Anderson uncertainty from the second (post{primary)
and third waves of the 1980 NES Panel Study; it is quite likely that we are measuring
changes in uncertainty about Anderson's issue positions after many voters had learned a
great deal about Anderson's positions.
It is apparent that voters were enjoying substantial reductions in their uncertainty
about the candidate's issue positions during the course of both campaigns. However, it
is still not clear if this reduction in uncertainty is in response to the political campaign,
or some other factor. Thus, we must examine media coverage of the candidates as well
as voter uncertainty if we are to draw a denitive link between the two. A precondition
for voter learning is that the electorate must be presented with information during the
campaign. To show that learning occurred regarding the uncertainty of the electorate
about the positions of the candidates in 1976 and 1980, we must demonstrate that infor-
mation about their positions was in fact transmitted during the election, and that voter
perceptions responded to this information.
The volume of media coverage for a given candidate in a given wave was recorded as
the number of \substantive" stories about that candidate's issue positions during that
wave. A media story was coded as substantive if it directly relayed information about the
candidates' issue positions. In 1976 the media data was obtained from a media content
analysis conducted by Thomas Patterson concurrently with the panel study. The news
content of both television and newspapers was analyzed throughout the course of the
campaign for substantive content. In 1980 the media data was derived from a content
analysis of the Los Angeles Times. Although information was often available for media
coverage of candidates stands on specic issues, the lack of coverage of some issues in
some waves would have necessitated dropping them from the study. Thus, we chose to
examine the media environment at a more aggregated level and consider all substantive
coverage of a candidate during a wave, creating a media volume variable that reected
the total number of substantive stories about each candidate in each wave.
To examine the information dynamics of the 1976 campaign we used Patterson's me-
dia content data. Patterson randomly selected over 6,500 politically related news stories
concerning the 1976 election from nine mass media outlets, including newspapers, mag-
azines, and television networks. Using this data, we rst aggregated the reference topics
during each month of the campaign following Patterson's guidelines: stories relating to
evaluations of the candidate, strategies, tactics, logistics, support, campaign style, horse-
race, appearances, and chances for victory were grouped under the label "hoopla", while
stories about the issue stands, ideologies, records, traits, and endorsements of the can-
didate were categorized as \substance." The results of this analysis for Carter and Ford
are presented in gure 3.
Figure 3 Here
13
Carter begins the election with almost no substantive coverage (only 6%). This is not
surprising, given that he was competing for substantive coverage with so many other, and
better-known primary candidates from both parties. But with early successes, Carter's
substantive coverage climbed to almost 30% of references in March through May, and
reaches a peak of 62.9% in July before falling to about 40% during the general election
months of September and October.
Ford, on the other hand, began with the lion's share of substantive coverage in January
(30%), and continued to receive about one-fth of all substantive coverage through July.
But during August, and the Republican convention, substantive coverage of Ford jumped
considerably, to 48% of the total. The seven issues available for study in 1976 comprised
a large proportion of the substantive coverage of Carter and Ford, or about 26.29%.
We undertook our analysis of the media coverage of the 1980 race in the same way as
for 1976. We undertook a content analysis of one major national newspaper | the Los
Angeles Times | during the entire election year (January 1 through November 4). We
attempted to replicate the story selection and coding content procedures outlined by the
Patterson study as closely as possible. This produced 5523 specic \candidate mentions"
(the relationship of a candidate to a specic topic) across the election year.
As in the 1976 media analysis, stories are aggregated into two categories, hoopla and
substance, using the same coding guidelines as for 1976. The results of this analysis for
Carter, Reagan, and Anderson are presented in gure 4. Carter receives almost a sheer
majority of substantive coverage during the primary season - he gets approximately 50%
of the substantive coverage through June, except for slightly less in February. As pres-
ident and as the front-runner in his party's primary, Carter clearly enjoyed tremendous
substantive coverage in the newspapers. Reagan, though, begins with little substantive
coverage through May. >From May until July his substantive coverage skyrockets, and
after a dip during the Democratic convention in August, it rises to 70% of candidate
related substantive coverage in October and early November. But we also see that An-
derson received very little substantive media coverage throughout the 1980 race. Only
very early in the campaign season | in March | does he receive at least as much cover-
age as one of the other two major{party candidates. Otherwise, Anderson receives little
substantive media coverage, especially in the general election campaign.
Figure 4 Here
Thus the prerequisites for voter learning were in place in both the 1976 and 1980 Pres-
idential campaigns. Individuals had access to a great amount of substantive information
about candidate issue positions through the media. Also, many individuals appear to
have learned a great deal about the issue positions of the ve candidates under scrutiny
in our analysis. We established stringent conditions for a priori evidence of voter learning
in the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns and the data presented in this section has
shown that the conditions existed in both of these elections for voter learning to occur.
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4 Multivariate Analysis of Voter Learning
However compelling this preliminary evidence is, the task of directly linking media ex-
posure and coverage to reductions in voter uncertainty remains. To do so we turn to a
multivariate analysis of voter learning, where the variables we wish to explain are each
voter's level of uncertainty about a particular candidate's issue positions. Our model of
voter learning posits that new information received by the voter will lead to reductions
in their uncertainty. An important test of our model will be to examine the impact of
new information on voter uncertainty, controlling for a series of alternative explanations
for voter learning.
In order to examine the eects of political campaigns on voter uncertainty we wish
to estimate the following equation for each candidate and issue:
logU
it
=  + 
1
 Subs
t
+ 
2
Media
it
+ 
3
 (Media  Subs)
it
+ (14)

4
Rep
it
+ 
5
Dem
it
+ 
6
 Talk
it
+ 
7
 Educ
i
+

8
Race
i
+ 
9
Gender
i
+ "
it
In this model, U
it
is the voter's uncertainty (measured as described in the previous
section) about the position of one candidate on one issue in a particular wave of one of
the panel studies; the dependent variable in the multivariate models is logged to give us
a continuous and unbounded measure of voter uncertainty.
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The most important right-
hand side variables are Subs
t
, Media
it
and (Media  Subs)
it
; the rst is the amount of
substantive media coverage of the candidate on issues during the period under study,
while the second is the individual's level of exposure to the media, and the third is the
interaction between these two previous variables. The key predictions of our model of
voter learning are that greater substantive coverage of the candidate's issue positions
in the particular time period, if received by the voter, will lead that individual to be
less uncertain about the positions of the candidate. In terms of the Bayesian learning
model, Subs
t
represents new information about the candidate; as more information is
made available to voters about the candidate in a particular wave (thus increasing the
precision of the new information) we expect voter uncertainty to decline. This leads us
to hypothesize that 
1
will be negative. Likewise, Media
it
represents the probability
that a voter will receive the new information available. As media exposure increases so
does the total amount of new information that the voter will be able to use to update;
thus we hypothesize that 
2
will also be negative. Finally, we include the interactive
term (MediaSubs)
it
to test for a non-linear relationship between information and voter
learning; we hypothesize that 
3
will be negative.
A number of exogenous control variables often associated with political information
and interest were also included. Race, gender, and education were all included in the
analysis. Dummy variables to account for the party identication of the respondent were
also included to lter out the potential eects of \partisan activation" (Lazarsfeld et
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al. 1944). We hypothesise that individuals who indicate a partisan preference should
have less uncertainty about candidates from their own party. Such individuals likely pay
more attention to their own party's primary, and will likely have more interest in media
coverage about their party's candidate. A dummy variable was also included for those
individuals who stated that they frequently spoke with others about the candidates and
the political campaign. We include this variable as a control for interest in the campaign,
as individuals who are more interested in politics may make more of an eort to seek out
information about the candidates. Note that substantive media coverage of a candidate
does not depend on the individual respondent and is thus subscripted only by t, while
education level, race and gender are invariant over time (or at least over the political
campaign), and are thus subscripted only by i.
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For both 1976 and 1980 we have observations from N individuals over T time periods
(the number of waves in the panel study), giving us a total of NT observations (minus
any missing observations). This type of data conguration is commonly known as panel
data. Panel data oers several advantages over cross-sectional or time series datasets.
For instance, analysis of panel data could not only detect a 15% unemployment rate
over time, but allow the researcher to determine whether this 15% unemployment rate
represented a group that remained unemployed for long periods of time, or if the 15%
unemployed was a constantly changing group over time. In the context of this study,
analysis of the panel data from the 1980 NES Panel Study and the 1976 Patterson study
will allow us to determine not only if voter uncertainty declines in response to political
campaigns, but who is experiencing the reductions in uncertainty to a greater or lesser
degree.
With N individuals observed over T time periods, the rst temptation is to pool all
observations and perform OLS on all NT observations. However, several strong assump-
tions are necessary in order for the pooled regression to be a valid statistical procedure.
Specically, in order for the pooled regression to be consistent and unbiased, we must
assume that voter learning is generated by the same process for all individuals in all
time periods. The assumption that the regression parameters take values common to
all individuals in all time periods is an exceedingly strong homogeneity assumption, and
amounts to assuming that all individuals learn at the same rate in every time period.
Clearly such an assumption is unrealistic. As we do not wish to assume homogeneous
parameters across individuals and over time, we must employ a model that explicitly
accounts for heterogeneous parameters. One model that meets our needs is the random-
eects (or error-components) model.
10
Consider the model
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If there are individual-specic eects that we have not captured explicitly in our
model, we can decompose the error term into an individual-specic component and the
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\usual" error term commonly assumed in OLS estimation. That is, !
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Therefore, all individual-specic sources of parameter heterogeneity are captured in the
residual. 
i
diers across individuals, but is constant for any particular individual. In this
context, 
i
captures unobserved attributes of the individual that aect voter learning.
We can represent (15) in terms of its individual means by
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Equations (16) and (17) are the source of the random-eects model. Estimating
equation (16) by OLS is known as the between estimator, for it estimates  by making
use of the variation between individuals in each time period. Estimation of equation (17)
by OLS is known as the within estimator, and estimates  by making use of variation
within each individual's behavior over time. The random-eects estimator is a matrix
weighted average of the within and between estimators, and is equivalent to estimating
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. If 
2

= 0 meaning (
i
= 0 for every individual), then
 = 0, and equation (14) can be estimated directly by OLS. However, if  is non-zero
then estimating (14) by OLS will yield biased and inconsistent estimates of .
A simple specication test for the use of the random eects model is the Breusch-
Pagan test, which is a test of H
0
: 
2

= 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that
signicant individual-specic sources of heterogeneity are present, and that a random-
eects model is an appropriate specication of our model. In all of the models estimated
in the following section the Breusch-Pagan test rejected the null of no individual-specic
heterogeneity at the p = 0:0001 level.
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5 Information and Voter Learning
The random eects model outlined above was estimated for each of the major candidates
in both 1976 and 1980. As discussed earlier, 1976 is a year in which we could expect
to see dramatic campaign eects due to the relative obscurity of the candidates. Voters
held little information about Carter and Ford at the beginning of the 1976 campaign,
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meaning that voters likely had weak prior beliefs about both candidates' issue positions.
These weak priors mean that even a small amount of information could lead to large
reductions in voter uncertainty. Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the estimation of
the random eects model for both Ford and Carter.
Tables 6 and 7 go here
Notice that our hypothesis about the relative strengths of priors held by voters about
that candidates is reected in the constant term. The larger constant values in the models
involving Carter indicate a greater degree of initial uncertainty held by voters with regard
to Carter relative to Ford. Thus we expect to see more learning eects for the Carter
campaign in 1976 than in the Ford campaign. To understand this we must recall the
Bayesian learning model. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in voter uncertainty in the
face of new information over several precisions of priors. As priors grow more precise,
the same amount of information will have less eect on voter uncertainty, all else equal.
Therefore, the weaker priors voters held with regard to Carter relative to Ford indicates
that learning eects will be stronger for Carter's issue positions.
It is apparent from examination of the three variables that pertain to the campaign
(the level of substantive coverage, the level of media exposure, and the interaction be-
tween these two variables) that the presidential campaign of 1976 had an impact on
individual perceptions both candidates involved. Turning rst to substantive coverage
of candidates, we observe dramatic changes in respondent uncertainty in response to
increased substantive coverage. The weak priors that voters held about Carter meant
that new information lead to signicant updating of individual beliefs about Carter's
issue positions. Thus the level of substantive coverage takes on negative and highly sig-
nicant values across all issues for Carter. The eects are less dramatic in the case of
the Ford campaign due to stronger voter priors, but increasing information still reduced
voter uncertainty about Ford's positions on defense spending, busing, and the role of the
government in providing jobs. At rst glance the coecients on the level of substan-
tive coverage may appear to be miniscule; however, one must recall that our dependent
variable is logged uncertainty. Thus, a coecient of  0:01 on substantive coverage rep-
resents a large decrease in uncertainty over the course of one wave of the panel study,
particularly when one considers that the level of substantive coverage in most waves for
most candidates was well over 50 stories
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Media exposure also emerges as a signicant factor in reducing voter uncertainty over
the course of the campaign. The coecient for the level of media exposure always took
on a negative sign, and was signicant for 5 of 7 issues for Carter, and 4 of 7 issues
for Ford. Obviously, increased media exposure allowed individuals to observe more of
the substantive coverage that was available about the candidates, and thus facilitated
learning. This seems especially likely in light of the insignicance of the interaction
term between the level of substantive coverage and the level of media exposure. It
seems that it is the sheer volume of information that an individual is exposed to that
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accounts for learning about candidate issue positions; learning and information have a
linear relationship.
Among the control variables, education, talking with others about politics, and gen-
der emerge as signicant factors in explaining voter learning. Turning rst to education,
we see that higher levels of education allowed individuals to greatly reduce their uncer-
tainty over the course of the campaign; in fact, education was the single largest factor
contributing to voter learning in both the 1976 and 1980 campaigns. Increased educa-
tion reduces the cost to an individual of gathering and interpreting information (Popkin
1991, Alvarez 1997). The reduced costs of information due to education are apparent in
these results. Those who engaged in political conversations with others enjoyed similar
reductions in their uncertainty. It seems likely that this variable represents both interest
in the campaign and an additional source of information. The higher costs of information
to women in electoral campaigns is also reected in these results. For both Carter and
Ford women experienced much more uncertainty about the candidate's issue positions
than did men. Interestingly, minorities, regarded as another subset of the electorate with
higher information costs, did not seem to experience much more uncertainty than the
population as a whole. Finally, our results reveal that there were almost no partisan
eects on learning about candidate issue positions in 1976.
The 1980 presidential campaign was a very dierent environment for voters than the
one in 1976. Reagan and Carter were better known to voters at the start of the 1980
Presidential campaign than Carter and Ford were at the same point in 1976, and thus
we expect voters to hold stronger priors about candidate issue positions in 1980 than in
1976. Thus, the eects of the campaign on voter learning for the major party candidates
in 1980 will likely be less dramatic than in 1976. But in the 1980 campaign we also
have a minor party candidate, John Anderson, whom most voters ought to have very
diuse prior beliefs about. So we do expect to see evidence of voter learning about the
issue positions of Anderson, since most voters likely began the campaign relatively poorly
informed about his issue positions. The random eects model was estimated for Carter,
Reagan, and Anderson in 1980; these results are given in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
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Tables 8, 9 and 10 here
As in 1976, we see that the constant terms in the models we estimate for each candi-
date reect the strength of the prior beliefs that voters hold about each candidate's issue
positions. Carter, as the incumbent about whom voters hold the strongest priors, has
the smallest constant terms relative to Reagan and Anderson. Likewise, the relatively
small constant terms for Reagan in comparison with Anderson indicate that of the two
challengers, it was Reagan who's issue positions were better known to voters. In terms
of the Bayesian learning model, we expect to see little in the way of reductions in voter
uncertainty for Carter, with greater learning eects for Reagan and Anderson.
Examining the variables that pertain to the political campaign in light of the priors
that voters held about the candidates is revealing. For Carter, the political campaign
19
appeared to have little eect in reducing voter uncertainty. Despite high levels of substan-
tive coverage regarding Carter's issue positions throughout the course of the campaign,
voter uncertainty does not appear to signicantly decline in response to new information
about Carter's issue positions. This is in line with the predictions of the Bayesian voting
model, and explains the lack of signicance of the level of substantive coverage and the
level of media exposure in the regressions involving Carter.
Much more voter learning is apparent when we turn to Reagan. The level of sub-
stantive coverage is of the predicted sign and statistically signicant across all issues.
Further, increased media exposure also contributes signicantly to reducing uncertainty
in 4 of 5 issues. Thus the evidence of voter learning for Reagan in 1980 closely resembles
that of Carter in 1976, as less precise priors allow new information to play a greater role
in shaping voter beliefs about Reagan's issue positions.
Interestingly, the reductions in uncertainty brought about by the Anderson campaign
seem to be less than those induced by the Reagan campaign, even though voters likely
held much weaker prior beliefs about Anderson. This is despite the fact that the coe-
cients on substantive coverage are negative and statistically signicant across all issues for
Anderson. Further, the magnitude of these coecients is much larger than that for any
other candidate, with the exception of some issues for Carter in 1976. This indicates that
a given increase in substantive coverage reduced uncertainty further for Anderson than it
would for any other candidate. However, the level of media exposure for individuals only
has a signicant eect on reducing uncertainty for Anderson's position on the level of
government spending. This, coupled with the relatively low level of substantive coverage
aorded Anderson over the course of the campaign, meant that voter uncertainty about
Anderson's issue positions was high even on election day. Although voter priors about
Anderson were weak, the lack of information available about Anderson's issue positions
during the campaign meant that voter uncertainty remained high.
The control variables in 1980 had much the same eect as they did in 1976, with in-
creased education and engaging in political conversations resulting in lower uncertainty
about candidate issue positions. Women continued to experience an informational dis-
advantage in 1980. Further, minorities experienced the same disadvantage, displaying
greater uncertainty in 1980 than they did in 1976.
Another interesting dierence in the 1980 campaign as compared to the 1976 campaign
is the role of partisanship. Partisanship played a role in voter learning about ideology,
as Democrats grew more certain about Carter's ideology and Republicans grew more
certain about Reagan's ideology. Further, Republicans reduced their uncertainty further
about Reagan's positions on other issues when compared to independents and Democrats.
No partisan eects were detected for the Anderson campaign. The 1980 presidential
campaign was much more partisan than in 1976; it seems likely that the partisan eects
observed here indicate partisan activation (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944), as Republicans and
Democrats began to pay greater attention to the presidential campaign and their favored
candidate in particular. Anderson, as an independent candidate, did not enjoy greater
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attention due to partisan activation.
6 Discussion
It is clear from this analysis that voters did learn about the policy positions of candi-
dates in both the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns. We demonstrated that many
voters did have substantial reductions in their uncertainty of candidate issue positions;
especially for candidates who were challenging incumbents. Secondly, we showed that
there was a substantial ow of substantive information during each campaign. Last, our
random eects panel models directly linked the information ow with the changes in
voter uncertainty.
However, we have only tested one aspect of the voter learning model presented above
| how the campaign information ow inuences the certainty of voter knowledge of can-
didate issue positions. Two aspects of the voter learning model remain to be examined.
The rst is to look carefully at how the changes in voter uncertainty during the course of
campaigns itself inuences voter preferences. If voters are risk averse, and they discount
candidates whom they are uncertain about, then we should see that the changes in voter
uncertainty about the issue positions of particular candidates should lead to correspond-
ing changes in voter preferences. Second, the same changes in campaign information
ow should also be producing changes in voter perceptions of candidate positions on the
issues, changing not only their certainty about where a candidate stands, but their per-
ception of where that candidate stands. These impacts of the campaign information ow
also need examination, since they are the second way in which candidates can inuence
voter preferences through their campaigns.
Nevertheless, this paper represents a step forward in examining the eects of political
campaigns on voters. We conclude that voters are able to use new information gathered
during the course of a campaign to reduce their uncertainty about the issue positions
of the candidates, with the rate of learning about each candidate dependent on the
amount and precision of the new information available about that candidate, and on the
precision of previous information held about that candidate. We observed a very high
rate of learning for Carter in 1976, when he began the campaign as a virtual unknown.
This situation was reversed four years later, when Carter began the 1980 campaign as the
incumbent president. In both campaigns the amount of substantive information available
about Carter was tremendous, but only the imprecise priors held by voters about Carter
in 1976 allowed for high levels of voter learning.
This leads us to assert that presidential campaigns do inuence the electorate, espe-
cially when the conditions are conducive for voters to learn about the policy positions
of the candidates. In our analysis here, we have identied two of these conditions: that
voters have relatively imprecise prior understandings of where candidates stand on pol-
icy issues, and that the media provide substantive coverage of the campaign. Although
our datasets provide us with several dierent levels of prior precision, substantive media
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coverage of the candidates is almost always high. Thus, to better understand the role of
media coverage in voter learning other types of elections must be studied, elections where
the level of media coverage is more likely to vary from the massive amount of information
provided during presidential campaigns.
Although the role of the media in voter learning cannot be completely understood
through the study of presidential campaigns, we undoubtedly nd evidence of voter
learning in this environment. Why do our results dier from those typically found in the
literature (e.g., Finkel 1993)? The answer, we believe, is that the model of learning we use
in this paper leads us to look for voter learning in places which haven't previously been
examined | instead of looking at whether the preferences of voters for specic candidates
change over the course of a campaign, we look for changes in the information that voters
have about the positions of candidates on policy issues. While changes in knowledge
of candidate positions on issues can ultimately lead to changes in voter preferences, we
believe that by not examining what voters know about the candidates previous work has
unfairly biased their results towards nding that campaigns \don't matter."
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Notes
1
A similar argument is advanced in Alvarez and Franklin (1994).
2
Many believe Bayesian learning models to be of little utility in the analysis of per-
ceptual formation and change. But the Bayesian model actually complements the psy-
chological learning models which have become popular in the political science literature.
Where the cognitive-psychological models have presented very complete descriptions of
the structures of past political information, whether they are termed scripts, schemas,
stereotypes, or whatever else, these models have been less descriptive as to the processes
by which new information is incorporated into these cognitive structures (some attempts
have been made in this literature to overcome this tendency; see Conover and Feldman
1989; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 1989). While Bayesian mod-
els are less descriptive in the structuring of past information, they are more rigorous in
the description of how newly-encountered information can be combined with old knowl-
edge for updated assessments of the political world. See Achen (1992) for additional
discussion.
3
Here we have assumed the normal distribution for simplicity. Other distributions
can be used in this model (DeGroot 1970). Also, we have assumed that the information
the voter receives is costless. Future development of this learning model, incorporating
costly information, is clearly necessary.
4
Derivations of this step are in Zechman 1978, Appendix A, as well as in Judge et al.
1988, Chapter 4, and in most references on decision theory (Berger 1985; DeGroot 1970;
Jones 1977).
5
Since the variances of these distributions are assumed to be positive, so are the
precisions. Under such conditions, the precision of the posterior will never be less than
the precision of the prior.
6
The incorporation of the updated knowledge of the candidate's position into the
spatial model is relatively simple to demonstrate. More exhaustive discussions are in
Calvert (1980) and Zechman (1978). Discussion of the standard spatial model of the sort
we employ here is found in Enelow and Hinich (1984).
7
Note that these assumptions are only required to demonstrate this theoretical model
probabilistically, and are not relevant in subsequent empirical evaluation of the model.
8
Our initial measure of uncertainty is bounded below at zero; taking the log of this
variable creates a continuous unbounded measure of uncertainty that is more amenable
to regression analysis.
9
The details of coding of each variable are as follows. Media exposure for each respon-
dent was constructed from respondent answers to two questions dealing with the type
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and frequency of media exposure. In both the NES and Patterson studies respondents
were asked if they watch network news every evening, 3 or 4 times a week, once or twice
a week, or less often. These responses were recoded to a zero-one scale, with one indi-
cating the most network news exposure. A dichotomous variable was also included to
indicate reading of a daily newspaper. This variable was coded one if an individual did
read a daily newspaper, and zero otherwise. This question was omitted from the third
wave of the NES Panel Study, but was included in the post-election wave conducted two
months later. Newspaper reading appears to be a behavior that remains stable over time
(Bartels 1993), and so responses to the post-election wave question were used as proxies
for the missing data. The network news and newspaper variables were added together
to create the media exposure variable used in subsequent analysis. Education was coded
on a zero-one scale, with 1 indicating the highest level of education (respondents were
placed in one of four categories; less than high school education, high school diploma,
some college, and college graduates). Gender is coded as 1 for female and 0 for male, and
race is coded 1 for African-American respondents and 0 for all others. Dummy variables
(Rep and Dem) indicate respondents who consider themselves Republicans or Democrats.
Finally, a dichotomous variable was included to indicate those who talk about politics
with others, and was coded 1 for those individuals who did engage in political discussions.
10
Another model often employed in similar situations is the xed-eects model, y
i
=

i
+ x
it
 + "
it
, where 
i
captures the unobserved individual-specic eects that enter
into voter learning. However, this model does not allow us to estimate coecients for
our time-invariant parameters (race, gender, and education), because 
i
captures the
eect of all such variables. Further, a random-eects model is more appropriate for our
particular case, since our data are a random sampling of a larger population, and thus
estimating constants specic to individuals in the sample would have little substantive
meaning.
11
Tables of these results are available from the authors.
12
Another specication test often employed to test for the use of the random eects
model is the Hausman test. The between estimator in the random eects model requires
that we assume 
i
and x
i
are uncorrelated. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test
is E(
i
jx
it
) = 0; it is a test of the zero-correlation assumption we make to estimate the
between estimator. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that there is correlation
between our individual-specic error term and our independent variables (probably due
to omitted variables) that could induce bias in our estimates. The Hausman test rejects
the null hypothesis for most of our models, with most of the acceptances falling on the
incumbent candidates (Ford in 1976 and Carter in 1980). This indicates that weaker
voter priors allow other factors to enter into learning about candidate issue positions.
Unfortunately, there is little further information available in our datasets that could be
used as instruments (Hausman and Taylor 1981). The usual correction in this case is
to estimate a xed eects model rather than a random eects model; we reject this
option for reasons explained in endnote 10. Essentially, estimating a xed eects model
in this case would merely drop all of the independent variables that are correlated with
24
i
from the model. Thus, in light of the limited amount of information available in this
survey data and our desire to estimate a model that includes time-invariant variables,
we estimate a random eects model with the understanding that some degree of bias is
inevitable in this case.
13
If a candidate's true position on an issue was 3.5, and the coecient on substantive
coverage was  0:01, and a respondent began the wave believing that the candidate's
position was at 5, then 95 substantive stories would be enough information for this
respondent to update their beliefs about the candidate's position to 4, all else equal.
14
Since issue positions for Anderson were not included in the rst wave of the 1980
NES Panel Study, we are only estimating the random eects model on the second two
waves of this study in Table 10.
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Figure 1: Voter Learning: New Information About a Candidate's Position
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Note: Each panel shows the eect of new information about the can-
didate's position, across the range of precisions of the new information
(given on the x-axis). The three levels of a voter's prior precisions of
a candidate's position (low, moderate, high), are given by each line.
The top panel gives the eects of the new information on the voter's
posterior mean, the bottom on the posterior precision.
Figure 2: New Information and Changes in Voter Preferences
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Note: Each panel shows the eect of new information about the can-
didate's position, across the range of precisions of the new information
(given on the x-axis). The dark line in each panel depicts new informa-
tion which indicates that the candidate not much closer to the voter;
the dotted line information that the candidate is much closer to the
voter. The top panel shows a simulation where the voter's prior was
imprecise, and the bottom panel where the voter's prior was precise.
Figure 3: Substantive Media Coverage, 1976
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Figure 4: Substantive Media Coverage, 1980
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Table 1: Changes in Carter Uncertainty Across the 1976 Campaign
Uncertainty of Carter's Positions
Issue Reduction Constant Increased
Ideology 60.8 38.3 0.9
(389) (245) (6)
Defense 51.8 47.1 1.1
(329) (299) (7)
Busing 46.1 51.9 2.0
(295) (332) (13)
Welfare 53.8 43.7 2.5
(344) (279) (16)
Abortion 54.7 43.9 1.4
(346) (278) (9)
Tax Cuts 60.6 38.7 0.8
(387) (247) (5)
Gov't Jobs 59.9 38.9 1.3
(382) (248) (8)
Table 2: Changes in Ford Uncertainty Across the 1976 Campaign
Uncertainty of Ford's Positions
Issue Reduction Constant Increased
Ideology 16.0 77.3 6.7
(102) (494) (43)
Defense 23.1 70.3 6.6
(148) (450) (42)
Busing 22.7 67.2 10.0
(145) (429) (64)
Welfare 19.3 70.8 9.9
(123) (452) (63)
Abortion 29.6 62.2 8.1
(190) (399) (52)
Tax Cuts 22.3 69.1 8.6
(143) (443) (55)
Gov't Jobs 22.2 69.6 8.1
(142) (445) (52)
Table 3: Changes in Carter Uncertainty Across the 1980 Campaign
Uncertainty of Carter's Positions
Issue Reduction Constant Increased
Defense 13.1 81.1 5.8
(79) (490) (35)
Gov't Spend 8.0 78.3 13.7
(44) (433) (76)
USSR 20.5 69.5 10.0
(128) (433) (62)
Ination 11.0 75.3 13.6
(42) (287) (52)
Ideology 11.0 78.0 11.0
(48) (341) (48)
Table 4: Changes in Reagan Uncertainty Across the 1980 Campaign
Uncertainty of Reagans's Positions
Issue Reduction Constant Increased
Defense 27.0 67.6 5.4
(169) (423) (34)
Gov't Spend 23.0 70.1 6.9
(127) (386) (38)
USSR 22.1 70.9 7.0
(142) (455) (45)
Ination 23.4 69.6 7.1
(96) (286) (29)
Ideology 15.2 80.4 4.3
(70) (370) (20)
Table 5: Changes in Anderson Uncertainty Across the 1980 Campaign
Uncertainty of Anderson's Positions
Issue Reduction Constant Increased
Defense 22.5 71.3 6.2
(130) (412) (26)
Gov't Spend 17.5 73.9 8.7
(119) (503) (59)
USSR 17.4 75.8 6.8
(113) (492) (44)
Ination 17.0 73.7 9.3
(112) (484) (9.3)
Ideology 17.0 73.5 9.5
(90) (388) (50)
Table 6: Ford 1976
Ideology Defense Busing Welfare Abortion Tax Cuts Gov't Jobs
Constant 0.79** 1.80** 1.81** 1.19** 1.29** 1.31** 1.00**
(0.18) (0.14) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18)
Subs Cov 0.003 -0.009** -0.016** -0.001 0.0004 -0.002 -0.009**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Media Exp -0.13 -0.20* -0.23* -0.41** -0.27** -0.12 -0.19
(0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) ( 0.07) (0.10)
Med*Subs 0.0002 0.0008 0.0004 0.002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Rep 0.08 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.15 0.09 -0.18
(0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Dem 0.05 -0.01 0.18 0.05 0.004 0.03 0.12
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Talk -0.37** -0.44** -0.52** -0.44** -0.37** -0.39** -0.32**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12)
Education -0.90** -0.85** -1.46** -0.89** -0.86** -0.69** -1.47**
(0.14) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (0.13)
Race 0.44* -0.03 -0.03 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.38*
(0.18) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.17)
Female 0.41** 0.41** 0.58** 0.38** 0.41** 0.37** 0.34**
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
Obs 4096 4097 4098 4094 4097 4097 4095
N 1175 1175 1176 1174 1176 1173 1175
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.08
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5% level, ** indicates signicance
at the 1% level
Table 7: Carter 1976
Ideology Defense Busing Welfare Abortion Tax Cuts Gov't Jobs
Constant 2.23** 2.54** 1.92** 2.18** 2.43** 2.71** 2.24**
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14)
Subs Cov -0.01** -0.01** -0.007** -0.008** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Media Exp -0.15* -0.20* -0.20* -0.34** -0.13 -0.15 -0.25**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
Med*Subs 0.0003 -0.002 -0.0001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Rep 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.32** 0.17
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Dem -0.02 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Talk -0.52** -0.66** -0.67** -0.66** -0.61** -0.83** -0.60**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Education -0.77** -1.01** -0.92** -0.86** -0.61** -1.05** -1.19**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Race 0.08 -0.15 0.01 0.17 -0.21 0.09 -0.01
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Female 0.35** 0.38** 0.41** 0.32** 0.31** 0.36** 0.32**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Obs 4102 4099 4096 4097 4089 4100 4098
N 1177 1176 1176 1175 1176 1176 1177
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.16
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5% level, ** indicates signicance
at the 1% level
Table 8: Carter 1980
Defense Gov't Spend USSR Ination Ideology
Constant 1.01* 1.20** -0.66 0.38 0.51
(0.42) (0.46) (0.41) (0.28) (0.43)
Subs Cov -0.002 -0.003* 0.003* 0.0003 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Media Exp 0.31 -0.07 -0.21 0.45* 0.48
(0.28) (0.32) (0.28) (0.19) (0.30)
Med*Subs -0.001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.001* -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rep -0.02 0.02 -0.19 -0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14)
Dem -0.09 -0.14 -0.13 0.15 -0.30*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13)
Talk -0.33** -0.23* -0.18 -0.22** -0.20
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
Education -0.93** -1.11** -0.73** -0.39** -0.84**
(0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17)
Race 0.27 0.69** 0.44* 0.25 0.26
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.18)
Female 0.11 0.23* 0.47** 0.15* 0.32**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Obs 1743 2193 2099 2215 1737
N 814 942 937 944 857
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5% level, ** indicates signicance
at the 1% level
Table 9: Reagan 1980
Defense Gov't Spend USSR Ination Ideology
Constant 1.23** 1.51** 1.54** 1.81** 1.76**
(0.23) (0.26) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
Subs Cov -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.003** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Media Exp -0.27* -0.37* -0.28** -0.32** -0.19
(0.13) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Med*Subs -0.0003 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Rep -0.29* -0.54** -0.09 -0.05 -0.24*
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Dem 0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01
(0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Talk -0.32** -0.54** -0.19* -0.34** -0.32**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Education -0.60** -1.04** -0.62** -0.67** -0.76**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Race 0.57** 0.43* 0.23 0.19 0.03
(0.20) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Female 0.40** 0.60** 0.41** 0.44** 0.29**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Obs 1844 2256 2163 2263 1825
N 861 961 960 959 893
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5% level, ** indicates signicance
at the 1% level
Table 10: Anderson 1980
Defense Gov't Spend USSR Ination Ideology
Constant 4.65** 4.24** 4.36** 4.35** 4.17**
(0.73) (1.22) (0.91) (0.94) (1.38)
Subs Cov -0.03** -0.03* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03*
(0.001) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.01)
Media Exp -0.53 -2.01* 0.41 -1.13 -0.85
(0.54) (0.91) (0.68) (0.70) (1.04)
Med*Subs 0.005 0.02* -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.005) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Rep -0.05 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.18
(0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
Dem 0.30 0.29 0.19 0.19 0.59
(0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19)
Talk -0.35** -0.53** -0.55** -0.43** -0.62**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16)
Education -1.26** -1.47** -1.21** -1.27** -1.87**
(0.13) (0.20) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24)
Race 0.56** 0.52* 0.34* 0.60** 0.29
(0.15) (0.23) (0.17) (0.19) (0.26)
Female 0.28** 0.60** 0.34** 0.46** 0.62**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16)
Obs 1327 1467 1429 1437 1273
N 793 833 825 829 784
R-squared 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.13
Note: * indicates signicance at the 5% level, ** indicates signicance
at the 1% level
